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BOUNDARY CONTROVERSIES BETWEEN STATES
BORDERING ON A NAVIGABLE RIVER
THE MINNESOTA-WISCONSIN CASE
THE controversy between Minnesota and Wisconsin as to the
boundary line between the two states in the waters which sep-
arate Duluth and Superior is one of long standing, and one that is
rife with points of interest in the development of the north
country at the head of the Great Lakes. The unanimous opinion
of the Supreme Court in the case of Minnesota v. Wisconsin'
delivered on March 8, 1920, by Mr. Justice McReynolds is note-
worthy not only because it settles once and for all the various
questions of law and fact involved in this dispute, but because
it gives the latest view of the Supreme Court on the much mooted
question of what constitutes the boundary line between states
of the Union which border on a na-igable river, and, in at least
one respect, qualifies and defines the rules of law previously laid
down.
I. THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT,
The constitution of the United States provides :2
"The judicial power shall extend . . . to controversies be-
tween two or, more states; between a state and citizens of another
state; between citizens of different states; . . . and between a
state, or the citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens or sub-
jects."
1 (1920) U. S. Adv. Ops. 1916-20, p. 345, 40 S. C. R. 313.
2 Art. III, Sec. 2.
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"In all cases . . . in which a state shall be a party, the
Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction."
The 13th Section of the Judiciary Act of 1789 provides :3
"The Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all
controversies of a civil nature where a state is a party, except
between a state and its citizens, or between a state and citizens
of other states, or aliens, in which latter cases it shall have orig-
inal, but not exclusive, jurisdiction."
While the language of the clause conferring jurisdiction is
general, disputes between states as to their boundaries would
seem plainly to be included thereunder. The soundness of this
conclusion is confirmed by the fact that when the constitution
was framed and adopted there were existing controversies be-
tween eleven states respecting their boundaries,4 a situation
which furnishes an interesting sidelight on the ineffective con-
gressional method of settling boundary disputes provided by the
Articles of Confederation, 5 and which obviously required the
establishment of some procedure more adequate than that there-
tofore in effect. Although doubted at times by men whose
names are written large in the history ot American law, the ju-
risdiction of the Supreme Court in this type of cases has been
upheld uniformly. The first case to come before that court
having to do with the question of boundaries between states
was that of New Jersey v. New York," which involved one of
the disputes pending at the time the constitution was adopted.
The opinion of the court in that case, though written by the most
eminent of its chief justices, is of the routine type. The court,
however, is held to have jurisdiction, largely on the authority
of the noted case of Chishohn v. Georgia7 the decision in which
was nullified by the passage of the eleventh amendment before the
judgment following that decision could be put into effect.
The next case is that of Rhode Island v. Massachusetts,
decided in 1838. In spite of the earlier decision sustaining the
court's jurisdiction, counsel for MIassachusetts, including Daniel
3 This section -has been successively re-enacted and is now known as
Section 233 of the Judicial Code.
4Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, (1838) 12 Pet. (U.S.) 657, 724, 9
L. Ed. 1233.
5The ninth Article of Confederation provided: "That the United
States in Congress assembled, shall be the last resort on appeal in alldisputes and differences now subsisting, or which may hereafter arise
between two or more States, concerning boundary, jurisdiction or any
other cause whatever."G (1831) 5 Pet. (U.S.) 284, 8 L. Ed. 127.
7 (1793) 2 Dall. (U.S.) 419, 1 L. Ed. 440.
8 (1838) 12 Pet. (U.S.) 657, 9 L. Ed. 1233.
BOUNDARY CONTROVERSIES BETWEEN STATES 465
Vebster, argued earnestly that the constitutional provisions quoted
supra were limited to questions involving property only, and did
not extend to political matters such as boundaries between states.
Although Chief Justice Taney dissented, the majority opinion of
Mr. Justice Baldwin sustained the court's jurisdiction in a pos-
itive and exhaustive fashion. The precedents and historic facts
are presented in a manner and order altogether convincing, and
there can be no question as to the soundness of the court's con-
clusion that it has "undoubted jurisdiction" in cases of this
type.
In the case of Florida v. Georgia,9 Chief Justice Taney,
apparently having changed his opinion in the matter, says:
"It is settled, by repeated'decisions, that a question of bound-
ary between states is within the jurisdiction conferred by the con-
stitution on this court."
The question of jurisdiction in this type of cases was raised
seriously as late as 1870, however, when the case of Virginia v.
West Virghti&i was before the court. In that case counsel for
West Virginia, of whom Reverdy Johnson was one, argued much
the same question as that raised by Webster thirty-two years
before. The conclusion of Mr. justice Miller is almost as posi-
tive as that of the court in the earlier cases:
"We consider, therefore, the established doctrine of this
court to be, that it has jurisdiction of questions of boundary
between two states of this Union, and that this jurisdiction is not
defeated, because in deciding that question it becomes necessary
to examine into and construe compacts or agreements between
those states; or because the decree which the court may render,
affects the territorial limits of the political jurisdiction and
sovereignty of the states which are parties to the proceedings."
The Supreme Court, therefore, has exclusive original juris-
diction to determine boundary controversies between states,
though of course, as impliedly provided in the constitution,:1
the states themselves, with the consent of the Congress, may
enter into an agreement as to their boundaries.
II. THE PROCEDURE.
Neither the constitution nor the precedents prescribe the
procedure to be followed in this type of cases. The court's
9 (1854) 17 How. (U.S.) 478, 15 L. Ed. 181.
10 (1870) 11 Wall. (U.S.) 39, 20 L. Ed. 67.
"1 Art. 1, Sec. 10.
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dilemma in the early cases is thus stated by Chief Justice Taney
in the case of Rhode Island v. Massachusetts :"2
"The case to be determined is one of peculiar character, and
altogether unknown in the ordinary course of judicial proceedings.
It is a question of boundary between two sovereign states, liti-
gated in a court of justice; and we have no precedents to guide
us in the forms and modes of proceeding, by which a controversy
of this description can most conveniently, and with justice to the
parties, be brought to a final hearing."
Without going into this-phase of the question with any degree
of minuteness, it may be stated that the following general rules
of procedure were laid down by the Supreme Court in the early
cases and have been followed without serious question in those
cases which came up thereafter:
(1) The rules and usages of equity practice are followed,
omitting, however, any niceties of chancery pleading or procedure,
so a's most expeditiously to bring the case to an issue on its real
merit3.1
3
(2) If the defendant state does not appear process will be
issued for its appearance, which process must be served on both
the governor and attorney general of such state.1 4
(3) "If the state shall refuse or neglect to appear, upon due
service of process, no coercive measures will be taken to compel
appearance; but the complainant or plaintiff will be allowed to
proceed ex parte."' 5
(4) An appearance once made by a defendant state may be
withdrawn upon due application, but in such case the complain-
ant state may proceed ex parte, as if no appearance had been
made on the part of the defendant."
(5) Ordinarily in these cases the costs are divided equally
between the states concerned, for the reason that, as stated by
Mr. Justice Brewer, in the case of Nebraska v. Iowa :17
"The matter involved is one of these governmental questions
in which' each party has a real and vital and yet not a litigious
interest."
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW
Considering the varied and diverse interests involved, the
number of boundary controversies which have come before the
12 (1840) 14 Pet. (U.S.) 210, 256, 10 L. Ed. 423.
13 Ibid. 257.
2 New Jersey v. New York, (1830) 3 Pet. (U.S.) 461, 7 L. Ed. 741.
15 Grayson v. Virginia, (1796) 3 Dall. (U.S.) 320, 1 L. Ed. 619.
16 Massachusetts v. Rhode Island, (1838) 12 Pet. (U.S.) 755, 761,
9 L. Ed. 1272.
- (1891) 143 U. S. 359, 370, 36 L. Pd. 186, 12 S. C. R. 396.
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United States Supreme Court is surprisingly small. Some of
them involve questions of fact only, and as such, though they
may contain much of historic or political interest, add nothing to
the principles of law involved. No attempt will be made in this
article to analyze or codify all the cases, and reference will be
made only to those decisions which seem most pertinent in the
developrient of the law of the phase of the question stated in the
title herein, or which contain matters particularly relevant on
their facts to the Minnesota-Wisconsin controversy.
The case of Missouri v. Kentucky18 is in the nature of a
pioneer case of its type. By the treaty between France, Spain and
England in February, 1763, the middle of the Mississippi River
was the boundary between the British and French territories,
and became the boundary between Missouri and Kentucky
when the former became a part of the Union in 1820. Both
states apparently admitted that the true line was in the middle
of the main channel of the river. The court assumes that the
question must be determined as of the time that Missouri was
admitted into the Union, or at least as of no later date. and
analyzes the evidence at some length. The opinion of Mr.
Justice Davis contains little of law, but several of his'comments
on the facts are so apt and trenchant as to warrant their quota-
tion:
"In a controversy of this nature, where state pride is more
or less involved, it is hardly to be expected that the witnesses
would all agree in their testimony."
"But it is said the maps of the early explorers of the river
and the reports of travelers prove the channel always to have been
east of the island. The answer to this is, that evidence of this
character is mere hearsay as to facts within the memory of wit-
nesses, and if this consideration does not exclude all the books
and maps since 1800, it certainly renders them of little value
in the determination of the question in dispute. If such evidence
differs from that of living witnesses based on facts, the latter is
to be preferred. Can there be a doubt that it would be wrong in
principle to dispossess a party of property on the mere state-
ments-not sworn to-of travelers and explorers, when living
witnesses, testifying under oath and subject to cross-examination,
and the physical facts of the case, contradict them?"
Both quotations apply with full force to the facts in the case
of Minnesota v. Wisconsin.
18 (1870) 11 Wall. (U.S.) 395, 20 L. Ed. 116.
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The case of Nebraska v. Iowa 9 is of interest because it first
applied the well recognized doctrines of accretion and avulsion
in determining the boundary line between states bordering on a
navigable river. The line between the two states was "the middle
of the main channel of the Missoui River." Between 1851 and
1877 in the vicinity of Omaha there were marked changes in the
course of the river's channel. Out of these changes the litigation
arose, both states claiming jurisdiction over the same tract of land.
In suits between private riparian owners it had been held
generally that where the banks of a stream are changed by the
gradual process known as accretion the line still remains the
stream, including the accummulated soil. It had been equally
well settled that where a stream suddenly abandons its old and
seeks a new bed, in other words, where an avulsion occurs, the
boundary line betyeen riparian owners remains in the old channel.
These principles are applied by the court to the boundary line
between the two states; the "muddy" Missouri is held to be no
exception to the general rule; and the law of accretion is found to
obtain at all the places involved, except in one instance where
the river "had pursued a course in the nature of an ox-bow,"
and "suddenly cut through the neck of the bow and made for
itself a new channel," in which case the boundary is held to remain
in the abandoned channel.
The opinion of the court, written by Mr. Justice Field, in
Iowa v. Illinois20 is undoubtedly the most important of all the
decisions in the cases involving this question. The words "middle
of the Mississippi River," were used in the Enabling Acts of
the two states. Iowa contended that the boundary was the mid-
dle line between the two banks or shores, while Illinois claimed
that the boundary was the channel upon which the commerce of
the river by steamboats usually was conducted.
The old theory that the boundary line between states sep-
arated by a river is the medium filum aquae-a line drawn through
the center of the river-is held not applicable to cases in which
the evidence shows there is "a channel of commerce," "one usu-
ally followed," "a channel of traffic," "one which is best suited
and ordinarily used" for the purposes of navigation. In such cases
the channel of commerce or the navigable dnd navigated channel
is held to be the boundary line between the states. The reason
19 (1891) 143 U. S. 359, 36 L. Ed. 186, 12 S. C. R. 396.
20 (1893) 147 U. S. 1, 37 L. Ed. 55, 13 S. C. R. 239.
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for this rule is stated by the court to be obvious, because "the
right of navigation is presumed to be common to both."
The court's conclusion is positive and decisive:
"When a navigable river constitutes the boundary between
two independent states, the line defining the point at which the
jurisdiction of the two separates, is well established to be the
middle of the main channel of the stream. The interest of each
state in the navigation of the river admits of no other line. The
preservation by each of its equal right in the navigation of the
stream is the subject of paramount interest."
Clear and determinative as is the opinion in the case of Iowa
v. Illinois, the point was reargued before the Supreme Court in
the case of Arkansas v. Tennessee,2 1 decided in 1918. on the
basis of a decision of the supreme court of Tennessee reaching a
contrary conclusion. The opinion, written by Mr. Justice Pitney,
is a clear affirmance of the earlier doctrine aid its conclusions:
"The true boundary line between the states, aside from the
question of the avulsion of 1876, is the middle of the main chan-
nel of navigation as it existed at the Treaty of Peace concluded
between the Ufiited States and Great Britain in 1783, subject to
such changes as have occurred since that time through natural
and gradual processes."
The question of acquiescence sometimes becomes of control-
ling importance in this type of cases. Though relied upon by both
Minnesota and Wisconsin in the controversy recently decided the
Court referred only inferentially to this point in its opinion, and
apparently considered that the facts supporting the claims of
both states in this connection fell short of the rules applicable,
a conclusion which, under the facts of the case, seems clearly cor-
rect. Several brief quotations from the decided cases will show
the general rules of law as to the effect of acquiescence on the
boundary line between two states:
"Surely this, connected with the lapse of time, must remove
all doubt as to the right of the respondent under the agreements
of 1711 and 1718. No human transactions are unaffected by
time. Its influence is seen on all things subject to change. And
he pointed out that every age, every century and every decade
this is peculiarly the case in regard to matters which rest in
memory and which consequently fade with the lapse of time and
fall with the lives of individuals. For the security of rights,
whether of states or individuals, long possession under a claim
of title is protected. And there is no controversy in which this
21 (1918) 246 U. S. 158, 62 L. Ed. 638, 38 S. C.. R. 301.
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great principle may be involved with greater justice and propri-
ety than in a case of disputed boundary. '22
"It is a principle of public law universally recognized, that
long acquiescence in the possession of territory and in the exer-
cise of dominion and sovereignty over it, is conclusive of the
nation's title and rightful authority."23
"The question is one of boundary, and this court has many
times held that, as between the states of the Union, long acqui-
escence in the assertion of a particular boundary and the exercise
of dominion and sovereignty over the territory within it should be
accepted as conclusive, whatever the international rule may be in
respect of the acquisition by prescription of large tracts of
country claimed by both. '24
IV. THE MIINNESOTA-WVISCONSIN CONTROVERSY.
The Wisconsin Enabling Act, approved August 6, 1846.
described the boundary of the proposed state in part as follows :25
"Thence down the main channel of the Montreal River to, the
middle of Lake Superior; thence through the center of Lake
Superior to the mouth of the St. Louis River; thence up the main
channel of said river to the first rapids in the same, above the
Indian Village, according to Nicollet's map; thence due south to
the main branch of the River St. Croix."
With the boundaries stated in the Enabling Act Wisconsin entered
the Union May 29, 1848.
The M\Iinnesota Enabling Act, approved February 26, 1857,
describes the boundary in part thus :26
"Thence east along the northern boundary of said state [Iowa]
to the main channel of the M\Iississippi River; thence up the main
channel of said river, and following the boundary line of the
State of Wisconsin, until the same intersects the Saint Louis
River; thence down said river to and through Lake Superior, on
the boundary line of Wisconsin and Michigan until it intersects
the dividing line between the United States and the British
possessions."
With boundaries thus described, Minnesota became a state on
May 11, 1858.
The controversy arises from diverse interpretations of the
italicized portions of the Wisconsin Enabling Act. Nicollet's
22Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, (1846) 4 How. (U.S.) 591, 639,
11 L. Ed. 1116.
23Indiana v. Kentucky, (1889) 136 U. S. 479, 34 L. Ed. 329, 10 S. C. R.
1051.
24 Louisiana v. Mississippi, (1905) 202 U. S. 1, 53, 50 L. Ed. 913, 26
S. C. R. 408.
25 Chap. 89, 9 Stat. at L. 56.
26 Chap. 60, 11 Stat. at L. 166.
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map, published three years before the passage of that Act, is
drawn on a very small scale and does not indicate definitely
either the mouth of the St. Louis River or the main channel of
tlat river. Nor were they located definitely until the decision of
the Supreme Court on March 8th. A brief statement of the
peculiar geographic and hydrographic conditions involved may
serve to clarify the matter.
At the westerly end of Lake Superior there are three pairs
of points or projections extending out from the opposite shores of
Minnesota and Wisconsin. The most easterly of these are known
as Minnesota and Wisconsin Points, the former about six miles
in length and 200 to 800 feet in width, the latter about as wide
but only approximately half so long. Between these points there
is a natural opening of approximately a quarter of a mile in
width known as the "Entry" or "Superior Entry." A canal
through Minnesota Point near the Minnesota mainland was cut
about 1870, and is known as the Duluth Ship Canal. Through
these openings the traffic from Lake Superior to the cities of
Duluth and Superior enters.
About a mile to a mile and a half westerly from Minnesota
and Wisconsin Points there is another pair of points, the one
reaching out from the Minnesota shore being known as Rice's
Point and that from the Wisconsin shore as Connor's Point.
The intervening water between these two pair of points is known
as Superior Bay, and is, as has been indicated, about nine miles
long and a mile and a half wide.
A narrow channel between Rice's Point and C6nnor's Point
leads into what is known as St. Louis Bay, or Lower St. Louis
Bay, approximately a mile and a half wide and three miles long,
at the Westerly end of which another pair of points is reached,
the larger of which extends from the Minnesota mainland and is
known as Grassy Poinf. The opening between Grassy Point and
the corresponding point extending from the Wisconsin shore is
about a aluarter of a mile in width. Beyond these points the waters
again widen out to a width of more than a mile in what is known
as Upper St. Louis Bay, with Big Island at its southwesterly end,
more than two miles from Grassy Point. From here on the waters
have well defined banks and the admitted characteristics of a
true river. Up the river southwesterly from Big Island a distance
of several miles is the Village of Fond du Lac, formerly a trad-
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ing post of the Hudson Bay Company and the Indian Village
referred to on Nicollet's map and in the Enabling Acts.
The various depths and channeis of these waters are thus
tersely stated in the opinion of the Supreme Court:
"Meade's Chart indicates: A depth of not over eight feet
across the bar at "The Entry." A deep channel through Superior
Bay; rather shallow water with a ruling depth of eight feet in
Lower St. Louis Bay; eight feet of water on a fairly direct course,
about a mile in length, from the deep channel south of Grassy
Point and east of Fisherman's Island to the deep water imme-
diately wistward of :the bar, about seven-eighths of a mile north-
east of Big Island. It further discloses a curving channel along
the west side of Grassy Point and thence close to the Minne-
sota shore and around Big Island, with a depth of fifteen or
more feet except at the bar, where there are only ten, possibly
eight, feet. To the South of Big Island lies the well-known and
formerly much used course indicated on Lieutenant Bayfield's
Map."
Meade's Chart, referred to by the Court, was made in 1861
under the direction of George Gordon Meade, then a Captain of
Engineers. It shows soundings taken with apparent care and
correctness throughout the waters in question, these soundings
being indicated on the map by figures and depth contour lines.




Fisherman's Island, also referred to by the Court, is a small
piece of land not indicated on the sketch from Meade's Chart.
This island has been largely obliterated by the government im-
provements in the channels of these waters, but before those im-
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provements were made this island was about 100 feet long by
50 feet wide, and was located in Upper St. Louis Bay, approxi-
mately midway between Grassy Point and Big Island. As to the
Bayfield Map the court says:
"During 1823-1825 Lieutenant Bayfield of the British Navy
surveyed and sounded the westerly end of Lake Superior and
the lower waters of St. Louis River. A chart compiled from data
so obtained (1:49,300,-4108 feet to the inch) and published in
1828, shows the general configuration and lays the proper sail-
ing course southward of Big Island. Prior to 1865 this was the
only available chart and navigators often used it."
The court, with entire correctness and incisive brevity, further
says:
"The level of the water within all the bays is substantially
the same as in Lake Superior; such current as exists flows in
opposite directions according to the wind and movement within
the Lake. The shores are irregular and much indented.
"Since 1893 the United States have dredged a twenty-two
foot channel through Upper St. Louis Bay and around Grassy
Point; thence through Lower St. Louis Bay (where there are
two branches) and between Rice's and Connor's Points; thence
through Superior Bay to "The Entry" and into the Lake. Ex-
tensive docks have been constructed from the Minnesota shore.
in both the upper and lower bays; those extending southwest
from Grassy Point across the boundary claimed by Wisconsin.
The general situation of 1846 continued until long after 1861,
but during the last thirty years extensive improvements required
for a large and busy harbor have produced great changes."
The line called in question is in Upper St. Louis Bay be-
tween Grassy Point and Big Island, that in Superior Bay and
Lower St. Louis Bay having been settled by tacit agreement
for many years. Docks worth millions of dollars have been built
out from the Minnesota shore on the westerly side of Grassy
Point and crossing the boundary claimed by Wisconsin, but
wholly on the Minnesota side of the center of the waters, and
also on the Minnesota side of the dredged channel referred to by
the court. For some seven years both Wisconsin and Minnesota
have taxed large portions of these docks claimed to be in both
states. Tax sales followed and the titles became inextricably
confused. Indeed at one time some person (claimed by neither
state nor its adherents) went so far as to paint the state line on
one of these docks at the point claimed by Wisconsin.
In 1911 an attempt was made to settle the dispute by a joint
boundary commission appointed by the respective states. This
commission convened in August, 1911, at Superior', and in
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August, 1912, at the Minnesota capitol in St. Paul. The report
of the commission from each state supports thoroughly the con-
tentions of that state, but the joint report reads:
"The controversy existing between the two states concerning
the bo'undary line is fundamental and substantial, and we find and
determine that there, is no opportunity to an adjustment of this
controversy which'does not involve a complete surrender by one
or the other of the states of its position and contention with
reference thereto. We therefore agree that this commission can
arrive at no satisfactory adjustment of these differences."
Various suits between private persons owning property on
the shores of the respective states in the disputed locality were
commenced in the succeeding years, and finally in October, 1916,
the attorney general of Minnesota made a motion for leave to
file a bill of complaint against the state of -Wisconsin in the
Supreme Court of the United States. A subpoena in due form
was served thereafter on the governor and attorney general of
Wisconsin, and on March 6. 1917, Wisconsin's answer and coun-
terclaim was filed, followed six weeks later by Minnesota's reply.
Thereafter a commissioner was appointed by stipulation to take
the testimony, which was heard in Duluth and Superior through-
out the months of August and September, 1917. The case was
briefed at length, and argued before the Supreme Court on
October 16 and 17, 1919.
As has been stated, the controversy comes from conflicting
interpretations of two portions of the Enabling Acts. Minnesota
has always contended (at times, as in the report of its boundary
commission in 1912, as the only reason for its claims) that the
mouth of the St. Louis River is southeast of Big Island, where
the physical characteristics of a true river end and the features
of a lake begin, and that the boundary through the disputed
waters, they being part of the lake, was therefore in the center
of those waters.
Although the supreme court of Wisconsin2 - and the lower
federal courts28 had come to the conclusion that the mouth of the
St. Louis River was between Minnesota and Wisconsin Points,
the United States Supreme Court, at two different times, had
refused to decide this question. In the Duluth ship canal case,
Wisconsin v. Duhuth,29 the court said:
27 Bright v. Superior, (1916) 163 Wis. 1. 156 "N. W. 600.
28Norton v. Whiteside, (1911) 188 Fed. 356; Whiteside v. Norton,
(1913) 205 Fed. 5.
29 (1877) 96 U. S. 379, 24 L. Ed. 668.
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"Whether these bays are considered as parts of Lake Superior
or as mere expansions of the river, is in our view immaterial."
Again, in the case of Norton v. Whiteside,3" the court said:
"The question whether the stretch of water and the channel
through it be treated as a part of Lake Superior, as asserted by
the complainant, or be considered at the point in issue as a mere
continuation of the St. Louis River, as asserted by the defendant
(a view held by both the courts below), is wholly negligible."
This question therefore was an open one before the Supreme
Court and was argued strenuously by counsel for both states.
Minnesota's evidence on this point substantially proves:
(1) That the waters of Lake Superior and not those of the
St. Louis River are dominant at the locality in question; (2) That
if the water coming down the St. Louis River should be diverted
or dried up, the disputed waters would still remain at approxi-
mately the same level as they now are; (3) That the oscillations
and changes in the lake's surface affect the waters as far as the
end of Big Island, but not substantially above that point; (4)
that the waters in the disputed locality flow in both directions
rather than in one direction as in the case of a river; (5) That
the waters of these bays are subject to the ebb and flow of the
true tide of the lake.
Though Wisconsin offered the expert testimony of certain
professors from its state University which tended to lessen in
some respects the effect of Minnesota's position on this point,
the sole reliance of its attorney general before the Supreme
Court, so far as this phase of the case is concerned, was that
the mouth of the St. Louis River was an unambiguous term,
definitely understood and intended to describe the space between
Minnesota and Wisconsin Points, this understanding being in-
dicated by historical data both before and after 1846.
Wisconsin's counsel summarize the position of that state in
this connection thus :31
"The mouth of the St. Louis River, as will be amply proven,
was so fundamental a term that it did not require location. The
mass of haphazard conjecture; the poor stock of oral tradition
and hearsay based on the uncertain memory of living witnesses
seeking to recreate and reestablish the mental content of a legis-
lative body that wrote the language in question three-quarters of
a century before this record was made up, is overwhelmed by the
long line of witnesses, of whose utterances and writings this
court must take judicial notice. With something of splendid
pageantry they throng to its attention from every rank and sta-
tion and from most diverse quarters of the land. Savage and
30 (1915) 239 U. S. 144, 60 L. Ed. 249, 36 S. C. R. 54.
31 Brief of Wisconsin, page 3, in case of Minnesota v. Wisconsin.
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scientist, courtier and coureur du bois, combine to weave a strand
of narrative in which the golden threads of heroic legend are
woven with the coarser fibre of a sometimes bestial common-
place. Grenville, John Jay, John Quincy Adams, Clay, Webster,
Benton, Calhoun, and Lewis Cass appear; the ascetic figure of
Nicollet with his ribbon of the Legion of Honor, burning out the
slender stock of his vitality in his zeal for scientific attainment
and coveted admission to the Academy of France; David Thomp-
son, gone to his too little distinguished grave, leaving a continent
his debtor by the magnitude and accuracy of his scientific ex-
ploration; David Dale Owen, Schoolcraft, James D. Doty, now
being honored as the "founder of Wisconsin," Alexander Ram-
sey, first governor of Minnesota Territory; Mackenzie, voyager
to the frozen northern seas and discoverer of the mighty river
that bears his name,-all pause to register confirmation of its long
standing significance and bring to a converging focus from their
diverse angles, one continuous, undeviating, historic meaning of
the phrase."
While one may doubt whether the court was required to take
judicial notice of all the writings of the statesmen and explorers
on which Wisconsin relied, (practically none of which were in-
troduced in evidence), and while the positiveness and vividness
of the conclusions quoted may be a bit exaggerated, those conclu-
sions are borne out substantially by the facts. Minnesota's con-
tention on this point was based almost exclusively on the physical
aspects of the situation: where the mouth of th& river actually
was; while Wisconsin's position was based on the historical data:
where Congress must have intended, to locate the mouth of the
river, taking into consideration the information which must have
been called to its attention.
The other phase of the controversy is the more important,
not only as indicative of the development of the principles of law
involved in this type of cases, but in the decision itself, though
until the bringing of the action it was largely neglected by Min-
nesota's adherents. Wisconsin took the position that the "curving
channel along the west side of Grassy Point" was the main
channel of the St. Louis River and hence the state line. Minne-
sota claimed that the shallower but more direct course also de-
scribed by the court in the above quotation, was the main channel
within the contemplation of the Enabling Acts, assuming that the
disputed waters. were part of the river and not of the lake. On
this point almost all of the early navigators in these waters were
called. Their testimony contains much of the early history of
the development of a new country, and, coming as it does from
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the very men who in a large measure made that history, it bears
an added interest. Indeed it is almost an autobiography of the
country at the head of the Lakes.
Only a summary of the evidence adduced and positions taken
by the two states on this point can be included herein. No evi-
dence of navigation in 1846 was obtainable. Admittedly, as
stated by the court, "such vessels as plied there in 1846 and long
thereafter, moved with freedom in different directions." But
Wisconsin contended with great earnestness.-and this conten-
tion was very much the corner stone of its argument on this
point,-that in the absence of navigation the line of deepest
soundings determined the boundary. Notwithstanding this insist-
ence that the line of deepest water controlled. Wisconsin took
issue with Minnesota as to the actual line of navigation when
navigation came to these waters and in this connectiopn called
many elderly navigators who testified in substance that the deep
water channel through these waters was used exclusively in the
navigation of the early days. except in going on the so-called
cut-off course south of Big Island. (Neither state contended that
the cut-off course was the boundary, whatever rights Minnesota
may have had so to contend admittedly having been lost years
before the beginning of the action.) The number of Wisconsin's
witnesses on this point was larger than that of those for Minne-
sota, but on the whole they did not disclose so much experience
in navigation as did the witnesses for Minnesota. But Wiscon-
sin's case in this connection was supported by the more or less
uniform understanding of the officers and employees of the corps
of engineers stationed at Duluth to the effect that the channel con-
tended for by Wisconsin was the main channel of the St. Louis
River. On one of the maps published by the corps of engineers
(1886) the words "main channel of the St. Louis River" are
superimposed on the channel contended for by Wisconsin, and in
later maps the words "channel of the St. Louis River" are so
superimposed. In a survey of Fisherman's Island made for the
General Land Office of the Department of the Interior the words
"main channel of St. Louis River" are clearly marked on the
Wisconsin channel, and, finally, in 1903. Captain Gaillard, the
officer then in charge of Duluth office, at the request of the chief
of engineers, wrote to the governors of Minnesota and Wisconsin
that the line contended for by Wisconsin was thought to be the
boundary between 'the states, and suggested that a new line be
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agreed upon in view of the changes made by the government
improvements and by industrial developments.
Minnesota took issue with Wisconsin squarely on its deepest
soundings theory, and argued that the navigation which first came
to these waters and continued up to the government improve-
ments in the early nineties was determinative of the main channel
of the river (if it was a river), and that this navigation, in so far
as it went north of the Island, was on the shorter course near
the middle of the bay. Minnesota's witnesses, including many
of the living early navigators of these waters, testified positively
that, while the southern channel was largely used. the boats that
went north of the Island followed the course contended for by
Minnesota because it was shorter, broader and of sufficient depth
for the boats of that day, and that the only time the deep water
channel was used was in going to a small sawmill on Grassy
Point. Minnesota argued that the corps of engineers had no
power to determine the boundary line between states, that the
maps relied on by Wisconsin were made at times and under cif-
cumstances which indicated clearly that the engineers had no
appreciation of the criteria going to determine a boundary line
between states bordering on a navigable river,-an argument that
was illustrated by the evidence of the only government engineer
called by Wisconsin, whose testimony showed that his idea of
the boundary was the line of deepest water, and who admitted
that Minnesota's witnesses were better qualified than he to de-
termine as to the actual navigability and navigation of these
waters.
Such were the claims of the two states., Minnesota: that the
mouth of the river was at Big Island, generally supported by
the physiographic and hydrographic conditions; Wisconsin: that
the mouth of the river was at the Superior Entry, supported by
historic and biographic references indicating an understanding
that such was the fact; Minnesota: that the main channel of the
river through the waters in question was on the short course near
the middle of the bay. based on actual navigation thereon when
such navigation came to these waters, but somewhat lessened in
effect by the fact that the larger portion of the traffic went not
to the north of Big Island, but to the south thereof, and on a
course not claimed as the boundary line by either state; ,Vis-
consin: that the line of deepest soundings controlled in the ab-
sence of navigation, but that the actual navigation of the early
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days was in fact on the deep water channel, and that the corps of
engineers, in a more or less decisive manner, had always regarded
such channel the main channel of the river.
V. THE DECISION OF MARCH 8, 1920.
The court decided the location of the mouth of the river in
two short paragraphs:
"The complainant maintains that within the true intendment of
the statute the 'mouth of the St. I.ouis river' is southeast of
Big Island, where end the banks, channel, and current charac-
teristic of a river and lake features begin. On the other hand,
the defendant insists, and we think correctly, that such mouth
is at the junction of Lake Superior and the deep channel between
Minnesota and Wisconsin points,--'The Entry.'
"It is unnecessary to speci fv the many facts and circumstances,
historical and otherwise, which lead to the conclusion stated.
They seem adequate notwithstanding some troublesome objec-
tions based upon the peculiar hydrographic conditions."
No law was involved in this point and its determination with-
out discussion is probably as satisfactory as if the reasons in-
ducing the court to come to its conclusion had been outlined in
detail. The decision, in this connection. when the arguments of
both states are considered, can be taken to mean that the court
is concerned more with what must have been in the mind of the
Congress than what the actual conditions were,-a conclusion that
is hardly in line with the theory of the thahoeg,-but the point is
narrow and the court has put its decision in such form that the
general proposition remains open,--it may be that Minnesota's
evidence as to the actual conditions was not thought convincing.
As to the second point the court says:
"The doctrine of thalweg, a modification of the more ancient
principles which required equal division of territory, was adopted
in order to preserve to each state equality of right in the beneficial
use of the stream as a means of communication. Accordingly,
the middle of the principal channel of navigation is commonly
accepted as the boundary. Equality in the beneficial use often
would be defeated; rather than promoted, by fixing the boundary
on a given line merely because it connects points of greatest
depth. Deepest water and the principal navigable channel are
not necessarily the same. The rule has direct reference to actual
or probable use in the ordinary course, and. common experience
shows that vessels do not follow a narrow crooked channel close
to shore, however deep, when they can proceed on a safer and
more direct one with sufficient water.
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"As we view the whole record, the claim of Wisconsin cannot
prevail unless the doctrine of thalweg requires us to say that the
main channel is the deepest one. So to apply it here would defeat
its fundamental purpose. The ruling depth in waters below
Upper bay was 8 feet and practically this limited navigation to
vessels of no greater draft. For these there was abundant water
near the middle line. Under such circumstances Minnesota
would be deprived of equality of right both in navigation and to
the surface if the boundary line were drawn near its shore.
"A decree will be entered declaring and adjudging as follows:
That the boundary line between the two states must be ascer-
tained upon a consideration of the situation existing in 1846,
and accurately disclosed by the Meade Chart. That when traced
on this chart the boundary runs midway between-Rice's point and
Connor's point, and through the middle of Lower St. Louis Bay
to and with the deep channel leading into Upper St. Louis bay,
and to a point therein immediately south of the southern ex-
tremity of Grassy point; thence westward along the most direct
course, through water not less than 8 feet deep, eastward of
Fisherman's island, and, as indicated by the red tract "A, B, C"
on Minnesota's exhibit No. 1, approximately 1 mile, to the deep
channel and immediately west of the bar therein; thence with
such channel north and west of Big island up stream to the falls."
The decision, therefore, was wholly in M\,Iinnesota's favor,
though on a point that was not much argued in the many years
the question had been at issue prior to the bringing of the action.
As a practical result of the decision the Minnesota shore line is
rendered vastly more valuable than if a contrary conclusion had
had been reached, and in all probability the Minnesota owners
who have paid taxes to Wisconsin (in one case more than
$40,000) will be able to recover the sums so paid.
The decision definitely determines that the deep water channel
is not necessarily the main channel of a navigable river consti-
tuting the boundary line between states, either in the absence or
presence of navigation at the time the states were formed. The
basic purpose of the doctrine of the thalweg, it seems, clearly
justifies this holding, though there are some statements in the
textbooks and in the decisions which indicate a contrary under-
standing. In definitely settling this question, so earnestly argued
by counsel for Wisconsin, the decision in this case adds distinctly
to the body of law applicable to cases of its type, and defines the
rules theretofore laid down in such cases.
Wisconsin's deep channel theory out of the way, the difficulty
with Minnesota's case lay not in the strength of Wisconsin's
evidence but in the weakness of Minnesota's own testimony. As
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has been indicated, Minnesota's evidence showed that the bulk
of the early traffic was to the south of Big Island in a channel
concededly not the state line. After stating that the south
channel was never accepted as the line, the court says:
"The evidence convinces us that as navigation gradually in-
creased prior to 1890, the northerly course in Upper St. Louis
Bay commonly followed by vessels going to or coming from
points above Big Island was not along the narrow curving chan-
nel skirting Grassy Point, but over the shorter one near the
middle of the bay."
The conclusion to be drawn is not that the court thought the
main channel shifted from one channel to another, but that the
northerly course argued for by Minnesota satisfied the underlying
theory of the principles of law applicable, and accomplished a so-
lution that was not only practical but altogether just. The course
determined upon by the court may not, to him who reads the
evidence in detail, seem to have borne the largest amount of the
early commerce, but it did bear more than the channel contended
for by Wisconsin, and the underlying reasons supporting the
doctrine of the thalweg seem fairly to require its application to
the course chosen in the absence of a claim that the south course
was the main channel. The decision, in this connection, shows
the court is interested keenly in the real justice of the matter,
possibly even more so than in the technical application of the
precedents, a conclusion which, at least in cases of this type,
must commend itself generally.
One further point may be mentioned in connection with the
case. It was argued in the case of Whiteside v. Norton,12 that
when the federal government, under its reserved power to improve
navigation, has straightened and deepened the navigable channel
within the original banks, the boundary line should follow the
channel so deepened and straightened. The circuit court of
appeals directly disapproved this argument and held the changes
caused by the government analogous to avulsion. The same point
was argued, though only briefly and somewhat parenthetically,
by counsel for Minnesota in this case, but it was not referred to
directly in the court's opinion. The opinion, however, does con-
tain the following sentence:
"It seems appropriate to repeat the suggestion made in Flash-
ington v. Oregon, 214 U. S. 217, 218, 55 L. Ed. 971, 972, 29
Sup. Ct. Rep. 631, that the parties endeavor, with consent of
Congress, to adjust their boundaries."
32 (1915) 239 U. S. 144, 60 L. Ed. 249, 36 S. C. R. 54.
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On authority which cannot be questioned it may be stated that
the court in the portion of the opinion last quoted had in mind
the advisability of both states' agreeing that the dredged channel
should be the state line, and to this extent at least the point must
have impressed the court. Indeed it seems not inconceivable, in
view of the court's general attitude in this case, that this argu-
ment might be adopted in a case where no other solution accom-
plishing justice could be reached. Perchance, too, the man who
first suggested that "the constitution follows the dredge," taunted
though he has been by his friends for his argument based thereon,
may one day be taken to have been something of a prophet.
Although the decision was in Minnesota's favor the costs of
the action were divided equally between the two states, in ac-
cordance with the rule in this type of cases above indicated. In
its opinion the court failed to follow the usual practice of appoint-
ing or providing for the appointment of a commission to survey
the line determined upon, and for that reason no decree has been
entered up to the present time. But a joint commission is being
agreed upon by the states, and after a survey by that commission,
the line stated in the opinion will be adjudged and decreed to be
the boundary between Minnesota and Wisconsin. Probably in
no future case will so much of the early history of the two states
be available; certainly it will not be available in the form used in
this case. The opinion is not only a scholarly statement of the
facts and law on a series of questions not entirely clear on either
side, but extends and defines the principles of law previously laid
down in cases of this type in a manner which accords that high
measure of justice which should obtain in all controversies be-
tween sovereign states.
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